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Abstract. Suppose we are given a proof of knowledge 'P in which a 
prover demonstrates that he knows a solution to a given problem in-
stance. Suppose also that we have a secret sharing scheme S on n par-
ticipants. Then under certain assumptions on 'P and S, we show how 
to transform 'P into a witness indistinguishable protocol, in which the 
prover demonstrates knowledge of the solution to some subset of n prob-
lem instances out of a collection of subsets defined by S. For example, 
using a. threshold scheme, the prover can show tha.t he knows at least d 
out of n solutions without revealing which d instances are involved. If the 
instances are independently generated, we get a witness hiding protocol, 
even if 'P did not have this property. Our results can be used to efficiently 
implement general forms of group oriented identification and signatures. 
Our transformation produces a protocol with the same number of rounds 
as 'P and communication complexity n times that of 'P. Our results use 
no unproven complexity assumptions. 
1 Introduction 
In this work1, we assume that we are given an interactive proof where the prover 
P convinces the verifier V that P knows some secret. Typically, the secret is the 
preimage under some one-way function of a publicly known piece of information. 
Thus the secret could be for example a discrete log or an RSA root. Such a 
proof is called a proof of knowledge [5], and can be used in practice to design 
identification schemes or signature systems. 
We assume in the following that the proof of knowledge has a special form 
in that the verifier only sends uniformly chosen bits. This is also known as a 
public coin protocoL For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to 3-round protocols, 
where the prover speaks first (generalization of our results to any number of 
rounds is possible). We also assume that the protocol is honest verifier zero-
knowledge {HVZK), i.e. the protocol does not reveal anything (for example about 
the prover's secret) to the honest verifier, but it is not necessarily secure against 
a cheating verifier. 
Numerous protocols are known to satisfy the conditions described above. 
Concrete examples are Schnorr's discrete log protocol [13] and Guillou-Quis-
quater's RSA root protocol [8]. None of these protocols are known to be zero-
knowledge or even witness hiding. In general, a parallelization of a sequential 
zero-knowledge (ZK) proof [7] will often satisfy the conditions. 
1 Partly done while visiting Aarhus University. 
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The second ingredient we need is a secret sharing scheme, i.e. a scheme for 
distributing a secret among a set of participants such that some subsets of them 
are qualified to reconstruct the secret while other subsets have no information 
about it. The collection of qualified subsets is called the access structure. The 
secret sharing scheme has to satisfy some properties which will be made more 
precise below. Shamir's secret sharing scheme [14] has the properties we need. 
Our main result uses a proof of knowledge P, an access structure I' for n 
participants, and a secret sharing scheme S for the access structure dual to I' 
to build a new protocol, in which the prover shows that he knows solutions to 
a subset of n problem instances corresponding to a qualified set in the access 
structure of I' (see Section 3 for details on access structures). The protocol is 
witness indistinguishable, i.e. the prover reveals no Shannon information about 
which qualified subset of solutions he knows. The new protocol has the same 
number of rounds as P and communication complexity roughly n times that of 
P. We also show that for some access structures, the new protocol is in fact 
witness hiding (WH), i.e. even even a cheating verifier will not learn enough 
to be able to compute the prover's secret. Although WH is a weaker property 
than general ZK, it can replace ZK in many protocol constructions, including 
identification schemes. 
Since a simple 1 out of 2 structure is enough for our result to produce a WH 
protocol, we obtain as a corollary a general method simplifying the design of 
WH protocols: first build a protocol 'P with properties as described above - for 
security against the verifier only the weak and therefore easy to obtain property 
of HVZK is needed. Then apply our result using a 1 out of 2 structure to get a 
WH protocol. This new protocol will have complexity equivalent to running P 
twice in parallel. 
After surveying related work, we give in the following two sections more 
details on the protocols and the secret sharing schemes we consider. Section 4 
then contains the main result and corollaries, and Section 5 describes a nice 
application of our results to group oriented identification and signatures. 
1.1 Related Work 
Our techniques are to some extent related to those of De Santis et al. [11]. 
The models are quite different, however: [11] considers non-interactive proofs 
of membership, while we consider interactive proofs of knowledge. Also, [11] 
considers variants of the quadratic residuosity problem, while we consider any 
problem that affords a protocol of the right form. 
In some independent work, De Santis et al. [12] apply techniques similar to 
ours to proofs of membership in random self-reducible languages. This leads to 
perfect ZK proofs for monotone Boolean operations over such languages. 
In [4], Feige and Shamir introduce the concepts of witness indistinguishable 
(WI) and witness hiding (WH) protocols and prove the existence of WH pro-
tocols for a large class of problems, including the ones we consider (Corollary 
4.4). This was done using general zero-knowledge techniques and the assump-
tion that one-way functions exist. Compared to [4], our result shows that if we 
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start from a proof of knowledge with properties as described above, WH proto-
cols can be constructed much more efficiently and without using computational 
assumptions. 
In [3], a transformation from HVZK proofs was given for protocols including 
the type we consider. That transformation produced ZK protocols, but on the 
other hand greatly increased the communication and round complexity so that, 
contrary to ours, the practical value of that transformation is quite limited. If the 
target is ZK, however, the increased round complexity seems to be unavoidable. 
2 Proofs of Knowledge 
Let a binary relation R = {(x,w)} be given, for which membership can be tested 
in polynomial time. For any x, its witness set w(x) is the set of w's, such that 
(x,w) ER. 
In the following, we assume that we are given a protocol P, which is a proof 
of knowledge for R, i.e. there is a common input x (of length k bits) to prover 
P and verifier V and a private input w to P. The prover tries to convince the 
verifier that w E w(x). Refer to [5] or [4] for a formal definition. 
In order for the constructions in the following to work, P needs to satisfy a 
few special properties. 
First, we will assume that Pisa three round public coin protocol (although 
the three round restriction can be removed). Conversations in the protocol will 
be ordered triples of the form 
m1,c,m2 
The second message in the protocol is a random bit string c chosen by the verifier. 
We refer to this as a challenge, and to the prover's final message as the answer. 
We also assume that completeness holds for 'P with probability 1, i.e. if indeed 
w E w(x), then the verifier always accepts. 
We assume that 'P satisfies knowledge soundness in the following sense: the 
length of c is such that the number of possible o-values is super-polynomial ink, 
and for any prover P*, given two conversations between P* and V, (mi, c, m2) 
and (m1, c', m~), where c # c', an element of w(x) can be computed in polyno-
mial time. We call this the special soundness property. It is easily seen to imply 
the standard soundness definition, which calls for the existence of a knowledge 
extractor, which can extract a witness in polynomial time from any prover that 
is successful with non-negligible probability. 
Although special soundness is less general than the standard definition, all 
known proofs of knowledge have this property, or at least a variant where com-
putation of the witness follows from some small number of correct answers. 
Assuming special soundness is therefore not a serious restriction. 
Finally, we assume that 'P is honest verifier zero-knowledge: there is a simula-
tor S that on input x produces conversations that are indistinguishable from real 
conversations with input x between the honest prover and the honest verifier. 
For simplicity we assume perfect indistinguishability in the following; general-
ization to other flavors of indistinguishability is easy. Most known honest verifier 
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zero-knowledge protocols in fact satisfy something stronger, viz. that there is a 
procedure that can take any c as input and produce a conversation indistinguish-
able from the space of all conversations between the honest prover and verifier 
in which c is the challenge. We call this special honest verifier zero-knowledge. 
We will later need the concepts of witness indistinguishable (WI) and witness 
hiding (WH) protocols, which were introduced in [4]. Informally, a protocol is 
witness indistinguishable if conversations generated with the same x but different 
elements from w(x) have indistinguishable distributions, i.e. even a cheating 
verifier cannot tell which witness the prover is using. If the problem instance 
x is generated with a certain probability distribution by a generator G which 
outputs pairs ( x, w) with w E w( x), we can define the concept of witness hiding. 
A protocol is witness hiding over G, if it does not help even a cheating verifier to 
compute a witness for x with non-negligible probability when the x is generated 
by G. We refer to [4] for details. 
With respect to the witness indistinguishable property, we can already now 
note the following: 
Proposition 1. Let P be a three round public coin proof of knowledge for rela-
tion R. If P is honest verifier zero-knowledge, then P is witness indistinguishable. 
Proof. We trivially have WI for conversations with the honest verifier: The use of 
any witness w leads to the distribution produced by the simulator. This implies 
that the distribution of m2 , given any fixed m 1 and c, is independent of w. The 
proposition then follows from noting that in conversations with a general verifier, 
the distribution of m 1, and hence of c, is independent of w. 
In many concrete cases, this proposition is not interesting because there 
is only one witness, in which case WI is trivial and cannot imply anything. 
Nevertheless, Proposition 1 will be needed in the following for technical reasons. 
2.1 An Example 
As a concrete example of a protocol with the properties we need, we present 
Schnorr's protocol from (13] for proving knowledge of a discrete log in a group G 
of prime order q. Let g =f. 1, and let x = gw be the common input. P is given w 
as private input. In the language of the above section, the protocol is a proof of 
knowledge for the relation that consists of pairs ( (x, g, G), w) such that x = gw 
in G. Then the protocol works as follows: 
1. The prover chooses z at random in [O .. q), and sends a= gz to V. 
2. The verifier chooses cat random in [O .. q), and sends it to P. 
3. P sends r = (z +cw) mod q to V, and V checks that gr= axe. 
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Completeness trivially holds with probability 1. Correct answers to two dif-
ferent o-values give two equations r1 = z + wc1 mod q and r2 = z + WC2 mod q 
so we find that w = (r1 - r2)/(c1 - C2) mod q. So special soundness holds also. 
Finally, note that by choosing c and r at random, we can make a simulated 
conversation (grx-c, c,r) between the honest verifier and prover. Since c can be 
chosen freely, we even get special honest verifier zero-knowledge. 
3 Secret Sharing 
A secret sharing scheme is a method by which a secret s can be distributed 
among n participants, by giving a share to each participant. The shares are 
computed in such a way that some subsets of participants can, by pooling their 
shares, reconstruct s. These subsets are called qualified sets. Participants forming 
a non-qualified set should be able to obtain no information whatsoever about s. 
Such a secret sharing scheme is called perfect. 
The collection of qualified sets is called the access structure for the secret 
sharing scheme. Clearly if participants in some set can reconstruct s, so can any 
superset, and therefore in order for the scheme to make sense, it must be the 
case that if A is a qualified set, then any set containing A is also qualified. An 
access structure with this property is called monotone. 
A special case of monotone access structures is structures containing all sub-
sets larger than some threshold value. Such structures are called threshold struc-
tures. 
Any monotone access structure has a natural dual structure. This concept 
was first defined in [15]. 
Definition 2. Let I' be an access structure containing subsets of a set M. If 
A ~ M, then A denotes the complement of A in M. Now r•, the dual access 
structure is defined as follows: 
The next propositions follow directly from the definition. 
Proposition 3. The dual I'* of a monotone access structure is monotone as 
well, and satisfies 
(r*)* = r. 
Furthermore, if r is a threshold structure, then so is r•. 
Proposition 4. Let I' be monotone. A set is qualified in I' exactly when it has 
a non-empty intersection with every qualified set in I'*. 
In the next section, we will assume we are given a protocol of the form de-
scribed in Section 2. For each input length k we will assume we are given a 
monotone access structure I'(k) on n participants, where n = n(k) is a poly-
nomially bounded function of k. Thus we have a family of access structures 
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{I'(k)I k = 1, 2, ... } We can then build a new protocol for proving statements 
on n problem instances provided we have a perfect secret sharing scheme S(k) 
for I'(k)• satisfying certain requirements to be defined below. 
Let D( s) denote the joint probability distribution of all shares resulting from 
distributing the secret s. For any set A of participants, DA(s) denotes the re-
striction of D(s) to shares in A. AB S(k) is perfect, DA(s) is independent from 
s for any non-qualified set A. So we will write DA instead of DA(s), whenever 
A is non-qualified. The requirements then are: 
1. All shares generated in S(k) have length polynomially related to k. 
2. Distribution and reconstruction of a secret can be done in time polynomial 
in k. 
3. Given secret s and a full set of n shares, one can test in time polynomial in 
k that the shares are all consistent with s, i.e. that all qualified sets of shares 
determines as the secret. 
4. Given any secret s, a set of shares for participants in a non-qualified set 
A (distributed according to DA) can always be completed to a full set of 
shares distributed according to D(s) and consistent with s. This completion 
process can be done in time polynomial ink. 
5. For any non-qualified set A, the probability distribution D A is such that 
shares for the participants in A are independent and uniformly chosen. 
Definition5. A perfect secret sharing scheme satisfying requirements 1-4 is 
called semi-mooth. If, in addition, requirement 5 is satisfied it is called smooth. 
It is natural to ask if for any family of monotone access structures there is a 
family of smooth secret sharing schemes. This question is easy to answer in 
case of threshold structures. In that case it is clear that Shamir's secret sharing 
scheme [14] can be used. This scheme is even idea~ i.e. the shares are of the same 
length as the secret. Given d or more shares, the secrets can be found, whereas 
with d - 1 or fewer shares, s is completely unknown. 
The following alternative to Shamir's scheme (which is also ideal) can lead to 
more efficient protocols than Shamir's when used in our construction (Theorem 
8) with a threshold structure when d < n/2. 
Again s E GF(q) is the secret, but the i-th share now is a number Cf E GF(q), 
1 ~ i ~ n, such that Be= se1 • Here, Bis an - d+ 1 by n matrix over GF(q), 
c = (c1, ••. , en.), and e 1 = (1, 0, ... , 0) is a vector of length n - d + 1. Matrix 
B should be such that any n - d + 1 columns are linearly independent (which 
implies that the rank of Bis equal ton - d+ 1). An appropriate choice for Bis 
therefore the first n - d+ 1 rows of a Vandermonde matrix over GF(q), say: 
The secrets can be recovered from any d shares as follows. Since Be= se1, 
it follows that s = E~=l Ci· Furthermore, when d entries of care known, the 
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remaining n - d entries follow uniquely from the equation B' c = o, where B' is 
the matrix B with the first row removed and o denotes a vector of n - d zeros. 
This is true because B' is a n - d by n matrix for which any n - d columns are 
linearly independent. In case less than d shares are known, the remaining shares 
can be chosen such that any secret is matched. 
For families of access structures other than threshold ones, the answer to the 
question on existence of smooth secret sharing schemes depends on whether the 
parameter n is a constant, or is allowed to increase polynomially as a function 
of k. 
In case n is a constant, there exists a smooth secret sharing scheme for any 
monotone access structure. For any minimal qualified set A, we do the following: 
choose s 1 , ... , slAI at random under the condition that s1 EB · · · EB slAI = s, and 
give ones, to each participant in A. This scheme was first proposed in [9]. 
It is easy to check that this scheme is smooth. In particular, the size of shares 
and the work needed in this scheme is linear in k, but the constant involved 
depends of course on n and on the access structure. However, the number of 
possible subsets is exponential in n, so for non-constant n this scheme will not 
necessarily be smooth. 
For non-constant n, it is an open question whether there are secret sharing 
schemes of the kind we need for any sequence of access structures. Benaloh 
and Leichter [1] have proposed secret sharing schemes for more general access 
structures defined by monotone formulae, i.e. Boolean formulae containing only 
AND and OR operators. 
Consider a monotone formula F with n variables. Any subset A of n par-
ticipants corresponds in a natural way to a set of values of the n variables by 
assigning a variable to each participant and let each variable be 1 if the corre-
sponding participant is in A and 0 otherwise. We let F(A) be the bit resulting 
from evaluating F on inputs corresponding to A. Then we can define an access 
structure I'p by 
A E I'p <=? F(A) = 1 
We let F* denote the dual formula, which results from replacing in F all AND 
operators by OR's and vice versa. It is not hard to show the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. If F is monotone then I'p is also monotone. Conversely, for 
any monotone access structure I', there is a monotone formula F, such that 
I'= I'p. We have that (I'p)"' = I'p•. 
In (1], a generic method is given that, based on any monotone formula F, 
builds a perfect secret sharing scheme for the access structure I'p. The formula 
F may contain general threshold operators, in addition to simple AND and 
OR operators. For a polynomial size formula, it can be shown that the secret 
sharing scheme from [1] satisfies all of the above requirements except possibly 
requirement 5. This leads to: 
Proposition 1. Let {I'(k)} be a family of access structures such that I'(k) = 
I'FJ. for a family of polynomial size monotone formula {F1c:}. Then there exists 
a famuy of semi-smooth secret sharing schemes for {I'( k)}. 
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A final comment before we go on to the main result is that we will need to 
distribute secrets of length t = t(k) bits, where t is polynomially bounded in k. 
This does not impose any restrictions on S(k) because any secret sharing scheme 
can distribute secrets of any length by running an appropriate number of copies 
of the scheme in parallel. We therefore assume that S(k) always distributes 
secrets of length t. Note that, if n is constant as a function of k, only one access 
structure and secret sharing scheme are involved. 
4 Main Result 
The next theorem describes the construction of a proof of knowledge from a basic 
proof of knowledge P for a relation R and a family of secret sharing schemes. 
In the constructed proof of knowledge both prover and verifier are probabilistic 
polynomial time machines, using the prover and verifier of P, respectively, as 
subroutines. 
For the statement of the result we need some notation. Let I'= {I'(k)} be a 
family of access structures on n(k) participants. Then Rr is a relation defined 
by the following condition: ((x1, .. ., xm), (w1, .. ., wm)) E Rr iff all Xi 's are of the 
same length, say, k bits, m = n(k), and the set of indices i for which (xi,wi) ER 
corresponds to a qualified set in I'(k). In a proof of knowledge for relation Rr 
the prover thus proves to know witnesses to a set of the xi 's corresponding to a 
qualified set in I'(k). 
Theorem 8. Let P be a three round public coin, honest verifier zero-knowledge 
proof of knowledge for relation R, which satisfies the special soundness property. 
Let I'= {I'(k)} be a family of monotone access structures and let {S(k)} be a 
family of smooth secret sharing schemes such that the access structure of S(k) 
is I'(k)*. Then there exists a three round public coin, witness indistinghuisable 
proof of knowledge for relation Rr. 
Proof. To improve readability we drop in the following the dependency on k from 
the notation, and write S = S(k), I'= I'(k) and n = n(k). We will distribute 
secrets of length t in S. If the length of any share resulting from this is larger 
than t, we will replace P by a number of parallel executions of P to make sure 
that a challenge is at least as long as any share.2 Note that this does not violate 
the honest verifier zero-knowledge nor the special soundness property. A basic 
idea in the following will be to interpret a challenge as a share. If challenges are 
longer than shares, we will simply take the first appropriate number of bits of 
the challenge to be the corresponding share. If c is a challenge, share(c) will 
denote the corresponding share. 
The following now describes the new protocol, in which A E I' denotes the 
set of indices i for which P knows a witness for x,: 
2 For some secret sharing schemes, there is a lower bound on the length of shares in 
terms of n. For Shamir's scheme, the length of shares is at least log2 (n + 1). If t is 
smaller than this bound, we can again replace 'P by a nwnber of parallel executions. 
182 
1. For each i E A, P runs simulator S on input xi to produce conversations 
(mi, c;, m~). For each i E A, P determines mi as what the prover in P 
would send as m 1 given a witness for input Xi. P then sends the values 
mi, i = 1,. .. , n to V. 
2. V chooses at-bit strings at random and sends it to P. 
3. Consider the set of shares {share(c.i)li EA} that correspond to the c.i from 
the simulation in Step 1. As A is non-qualified in r•, requirement 4 guaran-
tees that P can complete these shares to a full set of shares consistent with s. 
P then forms challenges Ci for indices i E A, such that share(Ci) equals the 
share produced in the completion process. This is done by simply copying 
the bits of the shares and padding with random bits if necessary. In Step 1, 
S has produced a final message m~ in 'P for i E A. For i E A, P knows a 
witness for x., and can therefore find a valid m~ for mi and Ci by running 
the prover's algorithm from 'P. Finally, P sends the set of messages ct, m~, 
i=l, ... ,ntoV. 
4. V checks that all conversations (ml, c;, m~) now produced would lead to 
acceptance by the verifier in 'P, and that the shares share(ct) are consistent 
with secret s. He accepts if and only if these checks are satisfied. 
It is clear from the assumptions on S that P and V need only poly-time and 
access to the prover and verifier of 'P. It therefore remains to be seen that the 
protocol is a proof of knowledge and that it is witness indistinguishable. 
Completeness is trivially seen to hold by inspection of the protocol. For sound-
ness, assume that some prover P* for a given first message {mil i = 1, ... , n} 
can answer correctly a non-negligible fraction of the possible choices of s. This 
means that by rewinding P*, we can efficiently get correct answers to two dif-
ferent values, say s and s' .3 Let the shares of s and s' sent in the protocol be 
share(ct) and share(i;), i = 1, ... , n, respectively. Then for every qualified set 
BE I'*, there must be an i E B, such that share(ct) I- share(i;) since other-
wise it would follow that s = s'. But then we also have that c; I- ~ and so by 
assumption on 'P, we can compute a witness for xi. So P* knows a witness in 
every qualified set of I'*. On account of Proposition 4 the set of witnesses we 
thus extract is a qualified set in the access structure I'. 
As for witness indistinguishability, we have to show that the distribution of 
the conversation is independent of which qualified set A E I' the prover uses. 
First observe that the distribution of each mi depends only on x 1 and equals the 
distribution of the prover's first message in an execution of P with Xi as input. 
This follows from Proposition 1, using that P is honest verifier zero-knowledge. 
In particular, the joint distribution of the mi's, and hence the verifier's choice 
of s, is independent of A. 
Since the set {share( c.)} is constructed by completing a set of uniformly dis-
tributed shares in a non-qualified set of S, the joint distribution of the share(ct)'s 
is simply D(s). Since the c.'s are constructed from the shares by possibly padding 
with random bits, the joint distribution of the c;'s is independent of A. Fi-
3 There are 2t possibles-values which is super-polynomial ink, whence any polynomial 
fraction of these contain at least 2 values for all large enough k. 
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nally,, Proposition 1 implies that the distribution of each m~ depends only on 
Xi, mi and c;, and is therefore also independent of A. 
Remark. If the secret sharing schemes are ideal, the communication complexity 
of the protocol in Theorem 8 is at most t bits plus n times that of 'P. Note 
that instead of taking several instances of the same proof of knowledge, it is 
also possible to combine different proofs of knowledge. In this way, one may 
for instance prove knowledge of either a discrete log or an RSA root without 
revealing which. 
Theorem 9. As Theorem 8, but with 'P special honest verifier zero-knowledge 
and S(k) semi-smooth. 
Proof- In this case the protocol from Theorem 8 is changed as follows. In Step 1, 
the prover uses S to distribute an arbitrary secret, and discards all shares in A. 
The remaining shares are distributed according to J>x. He then runs the special 
simulator on the corresponding challenges. Note that the completion process can 
still be performed on account of requirement 4, and as before, the honest prover 
can counter any challenges by the verifier. Soundness is proven in the same way 
as before. Therefore, the modified scheme still constitutes a proof of knowledge 
for relation Rr. 
As for witness indistinguishability, we only have to note that the distribution 
of any mi generated by the (special) simulator is the same for any particular 
challenge value Ci. used, because m1 in a real execution of 'P is independent of 
the challenge. Therefore the joint distribution of the m1 's is the same as in the 
case of Theorem 8. The rest of the proof is therefore the same as for Theorem 8. 
The witness indistinguishable property of the protocol from Theorem 8 leads 
us to a generalization of Theorem 4.3 of [4]. To state the result, we need to 
introduce the concept of an invulnerable generator G for a relation R. Such 
generators were first introduced in [6] and later used in slightly modified form in 
[4]. Such a generator is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which outputs 
a pair (x, w) E R. The generator is invulnerable if no probabilistic polynomial 
time enemy given only :z; can compute an element in w(x) with non-negligible 
probability, taken over the coin flips of both G and the enemy. 
Thus, asserting the existence of an invulnerable generator for a relation is 
a way of stating that it is feasible to generate hard, solved instances of the 
underlying computational problem. 
For any generator G, we let en denote the generator that produces an n-
tuple of pairs in R by running G independently n times in parallel. We will also 
need some notation for access structures: for a monotone access structure I', we 
let the sets in r correspond to subsets of the index set N = {l, .. ., n}. Now let 
the set Ir ~ N be defined by: i E Ir iff i is contained in every qualified set in 
I'. It is easy to see by monotonicity of I' that i E Ir precisely if N \ {i} is not 
qualified (using Proposition 4). 
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Theorem 10. Let 'P be a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge for the 
relation Rr, where I' = {I'(k)} is a family of monotone access structures on 
n(k) participants, and R is a binary relation. If for all k, I'(k) contains at least 
two different minimal qualified sets, and there is an invulnerable generator G for 
R, then 'P is witness hiding over G"'("lt:). 
Proof. We follow the line of reasoning from Thm. 4.3 of [4]. Suppose we are given 
an probabilistic polynomial time enemy A that has non-negligible probability of 
computing a witness, using the honest prover in the scheme from Theorem 8 as a 
subroutine. We show that A can be compiled into an algorithm that solves with 
non-negligible probability random instances x generated by G, thus contradicting 
the invulnerability of the generator (see [4]). 
From the assumption on I'(k) = I' (at least two minimal qualified sets) 
it follows that N \ lr must contain at least two elements, and that lr is not 
qualified. 
Our compilation now works as follows: 
1. Recall that our input is a problem instance x generated by G. We now form 
an n tuple of instances (x1, ... , xn) as follows: choose at random j EN, and 
let Xj = x. For all other indices i, run G to produce a solved instance xi and 
save the witness w,. 
2. Give x1, ••• , Xn as input to A. When A needs to interact with the prover, we 
simply simulate the prover's algorithm in 'P. If j <;. lr, this can be done, 
since then N \ {j} is qualified and we know witnesses of all instances except 
Xj· If j E Ir, we fail and stop. 
3. If A is successful, it outputs a witness for the relation Rr which by definition 
is a set of witnesses { w,} corresponding to a qualified set A in I'. If j E A, 
we have success and can output w3. Else output something random. 
We now show that this compilation finds a witness for x with non-negligible 
probability. It is sufficient to show that we find a witness with non-negligible 
probability given that j t/. Ir since this happens with probability at least 2/n. 
Now note that the joint distribution of the xi's we give to A is the same as 
in an ordinary interaction with the prover. Therefore A is successful with non-
negligible probability by assumption. We therefore only have to bound the prob-
ability that j is in A, the set of witnesses we get from A. Since I r is not qualified, 
A must contain at least one index not in Ir. By witness indistinguishability, A 
has no information about which j in N \ Ir we have chosen, and so the proba-
bility that j EA is at least 1/IN \ Irl· Hence if A has success probability € 1 our 
success probability given that j t/. Ir is at least f./n, which is non-negligible. 
Note that an access structure has at least two minimal qualified sets ex-
actly when the corresponding minimal CNF-formula contains at least one OR-
operator. 
Note also that this result only shows that an enemy cannot compute a com-
plete qualified set of witnesses. It does not rule out that the protocol could help 
him to compute a small, non-qualified set. Ideally, we would like to prove that 
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the enemy cannot compute even a single witness. With a stronger assumption 
on the access structure, this can be done: 
Corollary 11. Let P be a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge for the 
relation Rr, where I' = {I'(k)} is a family of monotone access structures on 
n(k) participants, and R is a binary relation. Suppose that for all k the set 
lr(k) is empty. Suppose finally that there is an invulnerable generator G for R, 
and that inputs for P are generated by cn(k). Then no probabilistic polynomial 
time enemy interacting with the honest prover can with non-negligible probability 
compute a witness for any of the Xi in the input to the protocol. 
Proof. Since lr(k) is non qualified, there are at least two minimal sets, and 
therefore the proof is the same as for Theorem 10, except that it follows from 
the assumption that the index j is always chosen among all indices. Hence if the 
enemy outputs at least one correct witness, there is a non-negligible probability 
of at least 1/n that this is the witness we are looking for. 
A certain special case of Theorem 8 is interesting in its own right: 
Corollary 12. Let P be a three round public coin, honest verifier zero-knowledge 
proof of knowledge for relation R, which satisfies the special soundness property. 
Then for any n, d there is a protocol with the same round complexity as P in 
which the prover shows that he knows d out of n witnesses without revealing 
which d witnesses are known. 
Proof Use Theorem 8 with, for example, Shamir's secret sharing scheme for S 
and a threshold value of n - d + 1. 
Corollary 13. Consider the protocol guaranteed by Corollary 12, let n = 2 and 
d = 1, i. e. the prover proves that he knows at least 1 out of 2 solutions. For any 
generator G generating pairs in R, this protocol is witness hiding over G2• 
Proof. Since protocols constructed from Theorem 8 are always witness indistin-
guishable, we can use Theorem 4.2 of Feige and Shamir[4]. 
Note that for this corollary, we do not need the assumption that G is invul-
nerable, as in Theorem 10. 
To build the protocol of Corollary 13, we need a 2 out of 2 threshold scheme. 
Such a scheme can be implemented by choosing random shares c1, c2 such that 
ci EB c2 equals the secret. Therefore, in the simple case of Corollary 13, the 
protocol constructed by Theorem 8 simply becomes a game where the verifier 
chooses a random s, and the prover shows that he can answer correctly a pair 
of challenges c1, c2 , such that s = c 1 EB c2. In the prover's final message, he 
only has to send c1 because the verifier can then compute c2 himself. Hence 
the communication complexity of the new protocol is exactly twice that of P, 
whence the new protocol is just as practical as 'P. 
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Corollary 14. Let {I'(k) = I'F,.} be a family of monotone access structure on 
n(k) participants defined by a polynomial size family of formulas {Fi.}, and let 
P be a three round public coin, special honest verifier zero-knowledge proof of 
knowledge for relation R, which satisfies the special soundness property. Then 
there exists a witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge for relation Rr(i.). 
Let M(k) be the maximal number of occurrences of a variable in F(k). Then the 
communication complexity of the new protocol is at most nM(k) times that of 
P plus t bits. 
Proof. By Proposition 3, I'(k)"' = I'F;. and since the size of FZ is the same as 
that of F,.., we can use the secret sharing scheme guaranteed by Proposition 7 
when we do the construction of Theorem 8. The statement on the communication 
complexity follows from the fact that the shares of the secret sharing scheme 
constructed in [1] from F(k) have maximal size tM(k) bits, so that we have to 
use M(k) parallel executions of Pin the construction of Theorem 8. 
5 Application to Identification and Signatures 
Suppose we have n users, for example employees of a company, such that the 
i-th user has a public key Xi and secret key w, E w(x,). Suppose also that 
certain subsets of users are qualified in the sense that they are allowed to initiate 
certain actions, sign letters on behalf of the company, etc. This defines an access 
structure on the set of users. Theorem 8 now gives a way in which a subset 
of users can collaborate to identify themselves as a qualified subset, without 
revealing anything else about their identities. This makes good sense, if they are 
to assume responsibility on behalf of the company, rather than personally. 
This also extends to digital signatures, since by using a hash function, any 
three round proof of knowledge as the one produced by Theorem 8 can be turned 
into a signature scheme by computing the challenge as a hash value of the mes-
sage to be signed and the prover's first message (this technique was introduced 
in [5]). By this method, a signature can be computed which will show that a 
qualified subset was present, without revealing which subset was involved. This 
is a generalization of the results from e.g. [10] and also of the group signature 
concept, introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [2]. One aspect of group signa-
tures which is missing here, however, is that it is not possible later to "open" 
signatures to discover the identities of users involved. 
Note also that our method allows participants to form groups completely 
freely, using the same keys in all groups. For example, two participants who 
normally use Schnorr signatures individually can go together and form a "l out 
of 2" signature without changing their keys or the basic algorithms in which 
they are used. 
6 Open Problems 
Two obvious open problems remain. First, can Theorem 8 be proved assuming 
ordinary soundness of P, and not special soundness? And secondly, can it be 
generalized to other types of protocols than public coin protocols? 
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